Whatever Happened to Good and Evil?

By Russ Shafer-Landau

Oxford University Press 2003 Paperback Buy here

Book Review
Reviewed by Nicola Moore

Much philosophical ink has been spilled asking and answering questions about morality. Unfortunately, Russ Shafer-Landau’s Whatever Happened to Good and Evil? attempt to answer one of the biggest debates in modern moral theory—whether morality is objective or subjective—in only 136 short pages, never quite rises to the impressive challenge it sets for itself.

The book focuses on the ways in which moral standards are defined. Does the answer to the question, “What is moral?” vary for different individuals, groups, and cultures? Or are there objective moral truths that demand there is only one right answer to such a question?  The school of moral theorists who provide an affirmative answer to the former question, belong to the group who may be called, broadly speaking, the moral skeptics.  The author affirms the latter view, and his purpose in this book is to raze theories of moral subjectivism, relativism, and nihilism to the ground in order to lay a foundation for a theory of moral objectivism. 

Partially inspired by the events of September 11th, to critique the skeptic’s position that morality is a human or social construct, Shafer-Landau capitalizes on the recent polarization of the concepts good and evil to show that morality consists of objective standards “…which are true independently of what anyone, anywhere, thinks of them.”  In Part One, the author sets up the discussion and defines the philosophical concepts to be examined.  He plans to take to task the positions of moral nihilism, subjectivism, and relativism—the schools of thought that maintain moral truths do not exist, are determined by individuals, or are created by societies, respectively. 

This is a particularly challenging charge because, as the author notes, the court of moral opinion tends not to be in his favor, especially among younger thinkers. In the face of such opposition, this book clearly targets a beginning audience of high school or early college readers without much philosophical background but who are likely already bent in a skeptical direction.  As a primer, this book has many good qualities.  The tone is casual and the material discussed is presented in a straightforward fashion making this book very accessible to the nascent philosopher.  The author also provides a glossary of key terms and synopsis of major arguments which are excellent resources for those who are new to philosophical writing. 

In Part Two, the author launches his major attacks on moral skeptics.  He addresses such topics as: the moral equivalence of skepticism, dogmatism, the value of tolerance, and possible contradictions of the theory.  While he covers a lot of ground, the burden of proof required to defeat moral skepticism is never quite met.  A pervasive problem with the style of argument in this section is that the reader feels as though Shafer-Landau is bullying rather than persuading him into agreeing with an objectivist position.  In order to deflate the subjectivist’s position that all moral opinions are equally valid, he employs some of the most heated examples in today’s political dialogue.  For example, he makes the argument that, “[n]o matter what your stance on abortion or the death penalty, for instance, you don’t seriously think the views in the opposing camps are as correct as yours.”  He is probably right. These are the issues about which people tend to be most passionate and obstinate. However, were the author to use a different example— perhaps the less divisive, more culturally relative idea of polygamy—it becomes more difficult to render agreement. 

The reader feels similarly exploited by the casual tone of the exposition.  The author attacks the moral skeptic with folksy appeals to the reader: “If moral truth is in the eye of the beholder, then those who see virtue in other’s suffering or enslavement are making no mistake.  Of course, neither are you, who oppose such things. But how comforting is that?”  It may not be comforting.  It is also not an argument.  What the author ought to be addressing is where our comfort zone comes from: convention or an objective universe of principles? The fact that we have such a comfort zone does not prove his point either way.  Unfortunately, discussion on this point is bracketed in favor of rhetorical techniques which, by the end of Part Two, are used to corner a skeptic’s sympathizer into supporting the Nazis, slaveholders, and someone who hunts his neighbors for sport.  While such techniques do not by themselves make Shafer-Landau’s arguments incorrect, they certainly make them unpersuasive.

Even the author’s more concrete logical analysis leaves the reader feeling as if problems have been too oversimplified in order to strengthen his case against skepticism such that when the end of each argument is reached it has failed to persuade the reader that Shafer-Landau is correct.  For example, in Chapter 9, “Contradiction and Disagreement” he makes the following argument against subjectivism: “The one who says abortion is acceptable is speaking the truth.  It follows that abortion is acceptable.  But the one who says that abortion is unacceptable also speaks the truth. It follows that abortion is both acceptable and unacceptable. That is a contradiction.”  Therefore, he concludes, subjectivism is contradictory. The way the line of reasoning has been set up, this does follow.  On the other hand, it is unlikely that a subjectivist would use so strong a major premise as “speaking the truth.” Rather, it is more likely that the subjectivist would qualify the statement abortion is (un)acceptable as speaking the truth for himself, and he would therefore not be subject to the contradiction into which the author has trapped him. 

Some of these criticisms might also be lodged against he author’s defense of moral objectivity in Part Three, but on the whole this section is the most impressive part of the book.  Here the author addresses such issues as the moral objectivist theory on the whole, whether such a system requires a god, assessments of moral knowledge, and the question “why be moral?” 

He opens the section by addressing the common criticism leveled at the moral objectivism: if there are truly so-called moral truths, name them.  Making the case that one can be an objectivist without all the answers to the world’s largest moral questions, he draws a compelling analogy between the plight of moral objectivists and scientists.  Physicists, the author points out, often have many different conceptions about the true shape of the atom, but in spite of these differing opinions it may be said that there is one true shape of the atom even if it is not known to us at this time.  In a similar fashion, he argues moral disagreement is not tantamount to an absence of objective moral truth. The truth might simply be unknown at this time.  By comparing ethics with science, Shafer-Landau nicely softens the position of the objectivist into something with which it is easier to identify and less rigid than may otherwise be expected from a moral system. 

A final element that improves this portion of the book is the use of quotations and references to well-know philosophers.  Citing (even if only to critique) David Hume and discussing the thought of Plato and Descartes not only lends an additional element of credibility to the work, but also provides his audience of introductory readers with ideas for further reading.

In summary, reading this book is much like taking an Ethics 101 course.  The course was enjoyable because the professor was good at explaining concepts and even cracked some jokes now and then. But, one still has the feeling that the short hour devoted to the lecture was not enough time to cover all the material in a meaningful way.  In the first chapter, Shafer-Landau states that the goal of the book is to discourage the reader from viewing morals as human constructions and to show that nothing has actually happened to good and evil—we just forgot they were out there.  In many ways, this goal is left unfulfilled. The case against skepticism does not sufficiently defeat it, and the case in favor of objectivism, while well formulated, is on the whole not persuasive enough to convince the reader of his position.